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The Choice of Offshoring Operation Mode: a behavioural perspective 
 
Abstract 
 
Since offshoring has recently become an integral part of corporate strategies, choosing 
the specific offshoring operation mode is a crucial aspect for CEOs. Using a sample of 
466 offshoring operations, this study analyses offshoring mode decisions from the 
rationale of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Drawing on this perspective, our 
results indicate that this decision seems to be clearly influenced by the manager’s 
intentions and partially determined by some competences originated in the resources 
and experience of the firm. Additionally and contrary to the common view in the field, 
our findings suggest that instead of being a possible intermediate option between the 
‘make or buy’ decision, concurrent offshoring can in fact constitute a final state in the 
evolution of MNE strategies.  
.  
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The Choice of Offshoring Operation Mode: a behavioural perspective 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A salient outcome of globalization has been the emergence and growth of global 
outsourcing and offshoring activities. Developed market firms have widely embraced 
these strategies to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and sustain competitiveness 
(Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Contractor et al., 2010; Maskell et al., 2007; Askin & Masini, 
2008; Jensen & Petersen, 2013; Größler, et al., 2013; Brennan et al., 2015). This wave 
of offshoring and relocation of value chain activities has been fuelled by liberal changes 
in the political and regulatory environments of host and home countries. Other 
contributing factors include more efficient, less expensive information and 
communication technologies, as well as new techniques for organizing the value chain, 
such as fine slicing and standardization of interfaces among activities (Pedersen et al., 
2013). 
Offshoring strategies are attempts by firms to disaggregate their value chains 
globally and to integrate the comparative advantages of geographic locations with the 
competitive advantages of firm resources and competencies (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004).  
Our study focuses on offshoring operations and, in particular, seeks to better 
understand the linkages between managerial attitudes and the offshoring operation mode 
choice: captive models, offshore outsourcing models, and concurrent models. Captive 
models entail locating organizational functions within wholly owned subsidiaries in 
foreign countries, whereas offshore outsourcing refers to outsourcing organizational 
activities to vendors situated in foreign countries (Pyndt & Pedersen, 2006). Concurrent 
sourcing models differ in that they engage in both making and buying simultaneously 
the same activity of the value chain (Parmigiani, 2007). The importance of this choice 
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has been shown in some noteworthy contributions (Mudambi & Venzin, 2010; Nieto & 
Rodríguez, 2011; Roza et al., 2011; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Larsen et al., 2013; 
Elia et al., 2014; Nordigården et al., 2014). However, there is still room for further 
contribution as the overall understanding of how managers make a selection and what 
constitutes the heuristic decision remains somewhat unclear.  
Our study extends the offshoring operations research in several ways. First, we 
enhance the field applying a general model based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) (Ajzen, 1988, 2002). The TPB has been widely used to analyse the link between 
individuals’ intentions and organizational behaviour in various fields of management 
such as entrepreneurship (Kolvereid & Isaksen, 2006), export activities (Acedo & 
Galán, 2011; Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997) or business growth (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2003). However, TPB has rarely been applied to study offshoring operations. We make 
this additional effort providing a new theoretical approach as there is an increasing 
recognition that operations management scholars should employ multiple theories from 
different disciplines to understand the complex nature of the offshoring lens (Mudambi 
& Verzin, 2010) 
Why companies use different offshoring operation modes? In this paper, we 
answer this key question using the argument that the choice will largely depend on the 
managers’ attitude (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007; Maskell et al, 2007; Lewin & 
Volverda, 2011). Managers have cognitive models that influence how they interpret the 
changes in their environment and how their interpretation leads to specific strategic 
choices. These models will impact significantly on the actions they can take (Ajzen, 
1991). In this sense, we stress the role of management in terms of operations choice. We 
review and empirically examine four primary beliefs and attitudes about offshoring 
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activities, related to cost cutting goals, market competitiveness, resource-seeking, as 
well as imitation issues.  
Interestingly, although there have been many studies identifying various 
offshoring drivers, few have approached the phenomenon in a comprehensive manner, 
both theoretically and empirically, to connect these drivers to specific offshoring 
operation choices. We integrate the aforementioned four offshoring motivations with 
choices of three offshoring operation modes. Our results substantiate the theoretical 
claim that attitude matters and the interplay of control and flexibility is central to 
linking offshoring motivations and operations modes.  
Second, we extend the existing knowledge by enhancing our understanding of 
the concurrent offshoring model. Although important in the strategy literature, 
concurrent offshoring has rarely been addressed in the offshoring operations literature. 
While outstanding developments by Parmigiani (2007) and Parmigiani & Mitchell 
(2009) discuss the simultaneous use of both strategic options, this contribution is limited 
to a sample of small and relatively simple firms in one single industry. Here we extend 
those contributions by including multinational firms within a wide range of industries 
and activities. Specifically, earlier research (Parmigiani, 2007) has pointed at the 
importance of this strategy as a discrete and different option to internal offshoring. 
Related to this issue, we aim to obtain more idiosyncratic findings in our sample of 
multinational firms in that concurrent offshoring could be framed as a final stage in the 
evolution of the MNE strategies, i.e., a transformational global sourcing strategy 
(Linder, 2004; Jensen & Petersen, 2013). 
 A final contribution is empirical. The proposed hypotheses are tested on a 
unique dataset covering 263 managers’ responses assessing 466 offshoring operations. 
This dataset allows us to study offshoring decisions in a disaggregated activity level 
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rather than in an aggregated firm or industry levels, being the latter typically the focus 
of attention in extant research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides 
the theoretical background. We define the three offshoring operation modes drawing on 
a control/flexibility framework and present our general model based on the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour. Following this control/flexibility rationale, we link the managers’ 
attitude to the offshoring operation choice and present our hypotheses. In the subsequent 
sections, methodological issues and major results and discussion are then provided. 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion on the contributions and limitations of this study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Offshoring operation modes: a control/ flexibility framework 
Previous research defines offshoring as the relocation of processes and /or activities into 
other countries (Levy, 2005). However, this relocation can be done in different ways. 
The company can outsource these activities to independent companies located in a 
foreign country (external offshoring) or it can perform these activities through its own 
subsidiary located in another country (internal offshoring).  
The Transaction Cost Theory considers sourcing decisions as a dichotomous 
choice between making and buying (Williamson, 1975), to which Parmigiani (2007) 
added concurrent sourcing. Concurrent sourcing models differ in that they engage in 
both making and buying simultaneously the same product or service (Parmigiani, 2007). 
Specifically in our context, firms adopting a concurrent sourcing model conduct the 
same activity of the value chain simultaneously by outsourcing to other firms in foreign 
countries and through wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.  
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Despite its apparent benefits, offshoring also poses challenges that firms have to 
cope with. Offshoring can lead to dependence on outside suppliers for services and 
difficulties in managing relationships with foreign vendors (Currie & Willcocks, 1997). 
However, a particularly challenging issue that most firms encounter in offshoring is the 
trade-off between control and flexibility (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). The environment 
where companies operate today – dynamics and volatiles – need flexibility as a valuable 
capability (Scherrer-Rathje, et al., 2014). Depending on the company’s control and 
flexibility needs, there exists a wide spectrum of offshoring options. Captive models 
offer firms full control over their offshored units in a foreign country due to ownership, 
yet foreign subsidiaries are more costly and lack sufficient flexibility due to the high 
level of commitment involved (Oshri et al., 2009). In contrast, offshore outsourcing 
offer firms greater flexibility, but poses a significant control challenge for sourcing 
firms since the counterpart is an independent entity. In terms of control and flexibility, 
concurrent models are situated somewhere between captive models and offshore 
outsourcing models yet are particularly costly and expensive to implement because the 
offshoring firm must incur the costs of both making as well as outsourcing (Parmigiani, 
2007). In such case, the benefits must outweigh the costs. 
Organizational control is defined as any process whereby managers direct 
attention, motivate, and encourage organizational members to achieve the 
organization’s objective (Jaeger & Baliga, 1985; Merchant, 1988). Therefore, the 
essence of organizational control is to direct resources and capabilities to realize present 
goals.  
Flexibility refers to the ability to respond to new information and changing 
conditions. There are two important aspects to flexibility -output and decision 
flexibility-, related to commitment and control respectively. Specifically, firms’ ability 
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to adjust their production functions encompasses a close association with their ability to 
handle fluctuating market demands (Sheshinski & Dreze, 1976). Low levels of fixed 
investment can lead to high levels of output flexibility. Firms with high levels of fixed 
investment tend to incur more losses under changing conditions than those with low 
levels because it is easier to adjust variable costs of production than fixed costs. 
However, decision flexibility is also critical to firms’ capability to cope with uncertain 
environments. Flexibility has a short and long-term strategic orientation. In the short-
term, it is the way to solve the problems of the turbulent environment; while in the long-
term, flexibility has ability to add capabilities to the system (Tamayo-Torres et al., 
2014). Higher levels of control, such as in subsidiaries but not in outsourcing, enable 
quicker and more adaptive decision making (Williamson, 1975). Thus, though both 
control and commitment-related flexibility enable firms to respond to changes in a 
timely and effective manner, there is a trade-off between the two. On the one hand, a 
high level of uncertainty and unpredictability in external environment require a high 
level of flexibility in firms. On the other, attaining such flexibility through lower 
commitment forms such as outsourcing pose obvious challenges to organizational 
control, which in turn can complicate decision-making.  
Captive models call for significant amounts of fixed investment; thus, firms have 
less flexibility to cope with fluctuating market demands. By adopting a captive model, 
firms’ foreign subsidiaries may not have a sufficient level of flexibility to respond to 
changing external environments and demands in a timely manner. Additionally, capital 
constraints are very important in the choice of the optimal procurement governance 
mode. As captive models are more capital intensive than others offshoring models, 
tighter capital constrain encourages offshore outsourcing or concurrent sourcing 
(Lambrecht et al., 2015).  
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Offshore outsourcing affords greater such flexibility but takes along an apparent 
control challenge for sourcing firms by impeding administrative flexibility. Here, 
sourcing firms cannot resort to formal or informal control mechanisms to align the goals 
of foreign vendors with theirs but have to rely on legal protection of contracts. In terms 
of control and flexibility, concurrent models are situated somewhere between captive 
models and offshore outsourcing models. Sourcing firms have restricted control over 
their external partners, yet their business is more inherently integrated with the latter’s 
in a concurrent model than the case with the offshore outsourcing model. 
Correspondingly, sourcing firms possess greater leverage over their foreign partners in a 
concurrent model than in an offshore outsourcing model. Similarly, the concurrent 
model enables sourcing firms to reduce their fixed investment by shortening their value 
chain, thus contributing to increased output flexibility (see Figure 1).  
*** Insert figure 1 about here*** 
The issue of control and flexibility in offshoring is in essence a question of how 
to structure internal versus external sourcing optimally (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). The 
degree of control and flexibility is closely related to the interplay between costs and 
benefits stemming from offshoring activities. In this sense, choosing the optimal 
offshoring operation mode is a key strategic decision that deals with complex and 
ambiguous issues, and requires the commitment of a large amount of resources from the 
organization (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976).  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991, 1998) provides parsimonious 
explanations of motivational influences on behaviour. According to the TPB, intention 
is assumed to be the antecedent of behaviour. Intentions represent a person’s motivation 
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in the sense of his/her conscious plan or decision to exert effort to enact the behaviour. 
Following Hutzschenreuter et al. (2007), human intentions’ in general are very rational, 
while managers’ intentions (called managerial intentionality) can be expected to be a 
mix of diverse goals and metrics. Ajzen (2002) established that behavioural intentions 
are determined by: (1) the attitude toward the behaviour (behavioural beliefs) stated as 
the degree in which an individual has a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the 
behaviour in question; (2) subjective norms (normative beliefs) that refer to the 
perceived social pressure to perform (or not perform) the behaviour and (3) beliefs 
about the presence of factors that may further or hinder performance of the behaviour 
(control beliefs). Subsequent research (Conner & Armitage, 1998) provided support for 
the efficacy of the TPB as a predictor of intentions and behaviour. The results of this 
meta-analysis showed that attitude was the strongest predictor of behaviour followed by 
perceived behavioural control and subjective norms respectively.  
In International Business (IB) the attitude of the decision-maker is a significant element 
in the choice to internationalise and in the selection of the governance mode (Game & 
Apfelthaler, 2016). There are some studies that prove these relationships (Calof & 
Beamish, 1995; Maignan & Lukas, 1997; Sousa et al., 2008). For example, to select or 
change a foreign market entry mode, Calof & Beamish (1995) showed that intuitions or 
attitudes of managers are important drivers in this key decision. In fact, some authors 
have warned about a possible underestimation of the link between managers’ attitudes 
towards exporting and firm export performance (Axinn, 1988). Even in the field of 
offshoring, Musteen (2016) finds evidence that some managers’ attitudes explain a 
more complete picture of the offshoring decision for companies across different 
industries and different stages of the lifecycle. 
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From this behavioural approach, the choice of the offshoring operation mode is 
an intentional-planned major strategic issue. As we have explained previously, each 
mode (external, internal or concurrent) has its intrinsic advantages and disadvantages, 
with the balance of short-term and long-term strategic benefits. The specific choice is 
the direct outcome of managers’ intentions and subsequent actions. Following TPB 
reasoning, managers’ intentions are the best predictors of managers’ behaviour; and 
managers’ attitudes, feelings of social pressure and perceived control are predictors of 
managers’ intentions (Game & Apfelthaler, 2016). In this sense, managers’ intentions 
are the result of a combination of factors that influence the final offshoring operation 
choice. Managers’ attitudes are one of the main predictor factors. According to Sommer 
(2010), “the attitude is the sum of relevant beliefs about consequences of particular 
behaviour”. Attitude is a dynamic element in human behaviour; it is the motivation for 
activity or influencer for the decision point (Lumley, 1928). Managers’ attitudes 
regarding offshoring operation are assumed to capture the motivation (offshoring 
drivers) that influence on managers’ intentions to implement the offshoring operation 
mode. 
Although attitudes are important predictors of intentions, the TPB additionally 
suggest the influence of social pressure to exhibit or not a behaviour. In our specific 
case, the rapid diffusion of the offshoring strategy by Western firms has eclipsed the 
political, academic and economic debate around the benefits and risks that are 
commonly expected. This social debate (Egger & Egger, 2006; Olsen, 2006; Arik, 
2013; Egger et al., 2015; González-Díaz & Gandoy, 2016) has been focused on the 
negative consequences that this strategy has on the economy in the countries of origin; 
these include impacts such as industrial dismantling, relocation of production or 
reduction of national employment, among others. However, this social negative 
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perception about the use of these strategies may vary depending on the type of firm. For 
instance, managers in family firms could feel higher social pressures than managers 
from non-family firms. Family-owned firms tend to be very integrated into local culture 
and traditions with a strong culture focused on continuity and long-term relationships 
(Venohr & Meyer, 2009). In fact, emotions could play a relevant role in managerial 
decisions, especially in family firms where the decision making is not entirely 
systematic and the firm's routines are not so well established. In a recent study, Musteen 
(2016) found that patriotism, or emotional attachment to one's country, either directly 
affected the choice of performing business activities offshore or made the decision 
making process more conflicted. Finally, the TPB suggest that motivation (attitude) and 
competence (perceived behavioural control) interact to determine the intention and 
consequently the behaviour. The resources available to a manager must shape -to some 
extent- the likelihood of behavioural achievement (Ajzen, 1991). Some firm specific 
factors such as size, experience or type of activity (e.g. Roza et al., 2011; Jensen & 
Petersen, 2013), for example, could be important to determine the resources and 
opportunities to exhibit a behaviour. 
Our general conceptual model is shown in Figure 2. The model shows the 
relationship between behaviour (managers’ decision about offshoring operation mode) 
and several predictor factors influencing managers’ intention (attitudes, social pressures 
and competences). However -as in previous studies applying TPB (Wilkund & 
Shepherd, 2003; Acedo & Galán, 2011) - not all the relationships drawn in the model 
are developed in hypotheses. This does not mean that we do not analyse all the 
relationships in the model; nevertheless, we mainly focus our attention on the direct 
effects of the main predictor (managers’ attitudes) and we control for social pressures 
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and competences. These direct effects are explained from a control/flexibility vantage 
point of view.  
***Insert figure 2 about here*** 
Hypotheses development  
To gain a better insight on why one offshoring operation mode is favoured over 
the other, it is important to first analyse managers’ attitudes regarding offshoring. 
Following the TPB perceptive, managers’ attitudes are one of the main predictor of 
managers’ intentions and consequently of managers’ behaviours in the final offshoring 
operation choice.  
There is a large body of global management literature concerning the drivers of 
offshoring (e.g. Lewin & Peeters, 2006; Maskell et al., 2007, Kinkel & Maloca, 2009; 
Kinkel, 2012; Roza, et al., 2011; Benito, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015). From 
this literature, four intentions are identified as primary drivers behind managers’ 
offshoring decisions: cost cutting, market competitiveness factors, resource seeking 
motivation, and industry practice.  
Cost cutting intention 
 Cost cutting has been traditionally considered managers’ primary motivation for 
offshoring (Kinkel, 2012; Größler, et al., 2013). Classical studies in the 1970s (Stopford 
& Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1979) showed how U.S MNCs offshored labor-intensive 
manufacturing processes to low-cost production countries. An extensive study on 
offshoring activities by the Offshoring Research Network concluded that most Western 
companies offshore primarily to cut labour costs and to induce other short-term costs 
(Lewin & Peters 2006). Offshoring enables managers to cut labour costs with respect to 
not only low-skilled but also high-skilled labour in less-developed countries. For 
example, McFarlan & Nolan (1995) found that the primary driver for managers in the 
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developed world to outsource their IT functions was to access low-cost specialized IT 
technicians in countries such as India. 
 The uncertainty associated with demand volumes may cause inefficiencies in 
terms of production capacity and consequently increases in costs (Hansen et al., 2011; 
Mols, 2010b; Parmigiani, 2007). Therefore, if cost reduction is the managers’ prime 
belief or motivation, they will choose the least costly offshoring operation mode. Thus, 
the offshoring operation choice will depend on the capacity of each offshoring operation 
mode to reduce costs. In this sense, external offshoring allows firms to transfer to third 
parties the costs of changes in demand and higher fixed costs, while internal offshoring 
would pay for those unpredictable changes. Additionally, by outsourcing non-core 
activities abroad, firms can narrow the scope of their value chain and shorten vertical 
links in the production process in-house (Pedersen et al., 2013). A shorter value chain 
helps firms further simplify their cost functions. Without the need to invest in plants, 
property and equipment integral to manufacturing activities, firms can offload fixed 
asset investment to their foreign partners. The reduction in fixed costs thus increases 
their ability to cope with business downturns. Third, the contracts between offshoring 
firms and foreign vendors clearly specify the responsibilities of both parties and 
stipulate the purchasing prices of goods or services. Uncertainties associated with cost 
control are thereby transferred from offshoring firms to their foreign partners. 
Moreover, firms are able to forecast their total production costs more accurately with 
simplified cost functions (Mols, 2010b).   
 Considering cost cutting motivation as the main driver of offshoring, external 
outsourcing offers the firm more advantages than internal mode. Concurrent offshoring 
is positioned as an intermediate alternative between both options. Concurrent offshoring 
offers the possibility of saving part of the internal costs as well as reducing uncertainty 
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associated with cost control. In this sense, concurrent offshoring has more advantages 
than internal offshoring. In fact, there is some empirical evidence enlightening how the 
use of external operation mode associated with outsourcing can lead to a reduction in 
costs of up to 40% (BCG, 2005; OECD, 2007). We can then argue that when managers’ 
motivation is based on cost cutting beliefs, his or her intention will commit the lower 
number of resources. In other words, managers’ attitudes based on cost reduction will 
probably increase managers’ intention and behaviour to choose the cheaper offshoring 
operation mode. Accordingly: 
H1a: Managers’ attitudes based on cost cutting will favour the intention to choose 
external offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations. 
H1b: Managers’ attitudes based on cost cutting will favour the intention to choose 
external offshoring operations versus concurrent offshoring operations. 
H1c: Managers’ attitudes based on cost cutting will favour the intention to choose 
concurrent offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations 
Market Competitiveness intention 
Offshoring not only provides firms with an avenue to reduce costs but also provides 
them with a means to improve their capabilities to compete. In this sense, research 
suggests that the offshoring and outsourcing of products and services should become an 
integral part of an organization’s overall strategy (Linder, 2004; Pedersen et al., 2013; 
Jensen & Petersen, 2013). As global competition intensifies, firms in more and more 
industries have begun to adopt the geographical dispersion of their value chain activities 
to create and maintain competitive advantages for strategic considerations such as 
accessing to new markets, improving product quality, reducing response time to 
changes and so on (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; Mudambi & Venzin, 2010; Gerbl et al., 
2016). These strategic actions increase market competitiveness (Roza et al., (2011). The 
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relocation of activities in other countries makes possible to get closer to potential 
customers and other opportunities. Offshoring is also an expansion strategy to access 
new markets and growth. Moreover, companies can choose offshoring as differentiation 
strategy.  
When companies use offshoring as differentiation strategy in which quality and 
speed are critical, control becomes more important than flexibility. Second, to the extent 
that product quality is pertinent to select segments of the value chain in which the firm 
has specialized, it would encompass a preference to utilize its superior capabilities in 
this regard. Third, there is also the concern of knowledge leakage. Here, external 
offshoring operations would limit the benefit from such recognition since offshoring 
firms are not directly associated with offshored activities in foreign countries.  
Concurrent outsourcing can also be a viable strategy here. First, like captive 
models, it helps firms accustom themselves to foreign environments and gain local 
recognition. Second, firms are able to better leverage and coordinate their resources and 
capabilities with those of their suppliers or contractors. This option allows managers to 
combine control and flexibility according to their needs. Hence, when managers’ 
attitude is focused on increase market competitiveness, it is very likely that their 
intention is to carry out more advanced offshoring operation modes. This consideration 
leads to hypotheses: 
H2a: Managers’ attitudes focused on increase market competitiveness will favour the 
intention to choose internal offshoring operations versus external offshoring operations.  
H2b: Managers’ attitudes focused on increase market competitiveness will favour the 
intention to choose concurrent offshoring operations versus external offshoring 
operations.  
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H2c: Managers’ attitudes focused on increase market competitiveness will favour the 
intention to choose concurrent offshoring operations versus internal offshoring 
operations.  
 
Resource seeking intention (capabilities focused)  
  The dynamic balance between the exploitation of the firm’s competitive 
advantages and the development of new ones is an essential source for the continued 
success of the company (Levinthal & March, 1993; Peng, 2001). Exploitation deals 
basically with the efficiency, utilization and improvement of the current capabilities, 
while exploration entails the search for and experimentation of new resources, often 
based on innovation (Meyer et al., 2009). Under this knowledge view of the firm, we 
can suggest two main effects in the configuration of the value chain. First, there is an 
increasing need to out-innovate competitors. The development of these innovation 
activities may require human or technological resources the company might not possess. 
Therefore, external offshoring operations provide firms a means to accelerate the access 
to external resources entering into alliance relationships with other firms (Nieto & 
Rodríguez, 2011). 
 Second, the firm needs to concentrate on focused, value-adding activities aligned 
with the core resources and knowledge base of the firm. In this sense, external 
offshoring operations enable firms to devote themselves to key activities by narrowing 
down the scope of their internal value chains. They can thus concentrate on and improve 
the quality of activities and capabilities that remain within the firm while outsourcing 
other (non-core) activities to others. By outsourcing peripheral or supplementary 
businesses to foreign partners, managers can allocate more financial and human capital 
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to increase specialization in their chosen areas through increased learning, shared 
experience and other such avenues (Alexander & Young, 1996). 
 Therefore, the decision to implement external offshoring operations versus 
internal offshoring operations will be driven either by the search for resources or 
capabilities that are "essential" to achieving a competitive advantage (if the firm lacks 
them) or by the need to externalize activities that are "non-essential" for the firm to 
focus on core competences. Here, again, concurrent options seem to be an intermediate 
position.  
H3a: Managers’ attitudes based on resource seeking will favour the intention to choose 
external offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations.  
H3b: Managers’ attitudes based on resource seeking will favour the intention to choose 
external offshoring operations versus concurrent offshoring operations.  
H3c: Managers’ attitudes based on resource seeking will favour the intention to choose 
concurrent offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations.  
 
Industry practice (imitation) 
 The survey by the Offshore Research Network revealed that 37 percent of the 
respondents cited industry practice as an important reason for them to engage in 
offshoring activities (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). The discussion of imitation strategy is 
extensive in the organization theory literature (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; Schewe, 
1996). The ultimate goal of this approach is to explain how and why organizations 
become institutionalized, where forms and procedures are taken for granted (Pfeffer, 
1987). 
 Schewe (1996) argued that imitation occurs due to inertia. Some firms are 
unwilling to make risky investment decisions and prefer to take a wait-and-watch 
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approach. When their competitors reap significant profits through offshoring activities, 
they then begin to follow suit. Therefore, following competitors is an important motive 
for firms to engage in offshoring, where firms are often ‘forced’ to adopt an offshoring 
strategy, either to seek institutional legitimacy or because their competitors are all 
garnering benefits from offshoring activities (Lewin & Volverda, 2011).  
Firms tend to adopt an imitation strategy and offshore solely to follow industry practice 
or competitor actions (Kauppi, 2013). The use of external offshoring operations in 
companies from different industries (manufacturing, technology, services, etc.) has 
prevailed (AT Kearney, 2005; BCG, 2005; KPMG, 2007; Lewin & Peeters, 2006; 
Lewin & Volberda, 2011; Rodríguez & Nieto, 2016). In the early years, firms prefer the 
internal offshoring model over the external offshoring model. However, over the years 
this preference has been shifted toward the external offshoring model regardless of 
nationality or function (Lewin & Volberda, 2011). Given that most firms offshore, and 
choose an external outsourcing model to cut costs, firms imitating their competitors are 
also more likely to adopt external offshoring operations. Furthermore, the benefits of 
external offshoring operations are easy to discern, and the short-term risks are relatively 
low compared with the other two offshoring operation modes. In terms of imitation 
practices, the consideration of external options provides the firms greater flexibility for 
future changes imitation in the offshoring options. In this sense, when managers’ 
attitude is focused on imitation and industry practice their intention and behaviour will 
be choose more external operation modes. Therefore: 
H4a: Managers’ attitudes focused on imitation practices will favour the intention to 
choose external offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations. 
H4b: Managers’ attitudes focused on imitation practices will favour the intention to 
choose external offshoring operations versus concurrent offshoring operations. 
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H4c: Managers’ attitudes focused on imitation practices will favour the intention to 
choose concurrent offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Research design and data collection  
The population of this study is composed of manufacturing companies in EU-15. We 
used the Amadeus database to identify the population. Two selection criteria were used 
to narrow down the population as we only selected companies: 1) that were “Global 
Ultimate Owners” and had subsidiaries abroad; and 2) where the status was active (or 
unknown). With these two selection criteria 3.460 European companies were selected. 
All were active and exposed to international activities as they all had at least one foreign 
subsidiary.  
To obtain the information, we sent a postal mail survey to these companies. The 
survey was translated into five different languages: English, French, German, Italian 
and Spanish. We used the back translation method and did not find any problem in 
translation issues. Four stages of pre-testing, including evaluations by academic 
colleagues, were made. The final questionnaire had 14 questions derived from the 
literature and adapted to the specific context. 
The questionnaire was mailed to senior-level managers who were most likely to 
be involved in the offshoring process, including CEOs or directors in charge of 
international operations. In the first round, 177 questionnaires were received, of which 
26 had to be dismissed. A remainder was sent out after 4 months, and here we received 
107 usable questionnaires. All in all we obtained a usable sample of 258 questionnaires, 
which represents a response rate of 7.4%. This is almost three points higher than those 
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obtained in other studies that have used a postal survey addressed to global 
manufacturing companies (Yip & Dempster, 2005).  
We linked the survey data for each firm to general firm and accounting data on the 
Amadeus database. This combination of primary data (survey data) and secondary data 
(Amadeus database) seeks to reduce the problem of common method bias (Chang et al., 
2010). As shown in Table 1, the 258 responses are distributed among 15 different 
countries providing a good representation of European manufacturing companies. 
 
***Insert table 1 about here*** 
Measurement  
Dependent variable:  
The dependent variable “Offshoring Operation Mode” represents the behaviour carried 
out by managers about the offshoring operation mode implemented. This variable is 
defined as a polytomous variable taking the value "0" when managers’ behaviour leads 
to implement internal offshoring operations, the value "1" when managers’ behaviour 
involves the choice of external offshoring operations and the value "2" when managers’ 
behaviour leads to implement concurrent offshoring operations (relocating the same 
activity using both offshoring modes). In total 466 offshoring operations were 
identified, of which 80 were external offshoring operations, 323 internal offshoring 
operations and 63 concurrent offshoring operations. 
 
Independent Variables: 
The independent variables are managers’ attitudes regarding offshoring operation mode. 
We approached managers in a more general sense asking them what his /her attitude 
was over doing offshoring. The questions we used as proxies of these attitudes were 
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addressed using the drivers of offshoring as done in the ORN project (Lewin & 
Volverda, 2011). However, we did not ask for a specific operation in a specific moment 
in a specific country, as most of the papers on entry mode do.  
Our approach was ex-ante, in other words, we requested about his/her opinion of doing 
offshoring encapsulated through the drivers of offshoring. From the 12 drivers to 
offshore that are highlighted in the literature, we asked managers to indicate on a 5-
point scale their opinion about the importance that each of these drivers had in their 
perception about offshoring (where 1 indicates very low importance and 5 indicate very 
high importance). 
Based on the received responses, we carried out a principal components analysis to 
identify the underlying factors of the 12 drivers. The results indicate that the 12 drivers 
could be grouped into four factors. These four underlying factors explain 65.1% of the 
total variance (among the 12 drivers). As shown in Table 2, factor 1 captures managers’ 
attitudes based on cost cutting, while factor 2 is integrated by managers’ attitudes 
focused on increase market competitiveness. Managers’ attitudes focused on resource 
seeking are more prevalent in factor 3, while managers’ attitudes focused on imitation 
practices are represented in factor 4. 
*** Insert table 2 about here*** 
The four independent variables, Cost cutting, Market competitiveness priorities, 
Resource seeking and Imitation practices, were created based on the factor loadings and 
factor scores for each manager. The adequacy of sample size was determined by Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure and Bartlett's sphericity test the results of which are presented at 
the end of Table 2. The results showed that performing factor analysis was acceptable 
and justifiable. Moreover, we calculate Cronbach’s Alpha for scale reliability, for the 
whole scale and for each individual factor identified. With an overall alpha of 0,706 
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(and an individual alpha of each factor near or higher to 0,7) scale reliability, or internal 
consistency, is acceptable.  
Control Variables:  
According to our research model (figure 1), as a proxy for subjective norm we use the 
type of ownership (family versus non-family firms). Negative social pressure against 
offshoring is perceived higher in family firms than in non-family firms. Moreover, 
family firms are more conservative than non-family firms (Pukall & Calabró, 2014) and 
emotions have an important role in their decisions (Musteen, 2016). Owners are often 
emotionally attached to their firm, which is an integral part of their self-fulfilment and 
family tradition. Their raison d’être is thus not only to maximize profits but to secure 
the company’s existence for the next generation through a long term perspective and a 
clear identification with customers, channels and other stakeholders (Venohr & Meyer, 
2009). Accordingly, family firms are less likely to use offshoring operations. However, 
if they do, managers’ intentions are more reluctant to lose control through the use of 
third parties since the threat of opportunism and the risk of losing reputational capital 
are higher than in captive offshoring (Pukall & Calabró, 2014). 
Finally, as proxies of competences (perceived behaviour control) we introduce 
some characteristics of the firm: company size, international experience and type of 
activity. Larger and more experienced companies have greater accessibility to resources 
and internationalization knowledge. Therefore, for these companies it is easier to carry 
out more advanced offshoring operations, such as internal offshoring operations or 
concurrent offshoring operations. 
In the same vein, depending on the nature of the offshored activity (productive, 
commercial or managerial) the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour 
will be different. Productive activities include R&D and product design, production and 
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purchasing; Commercial activities include marketing, sales and after-sales activities; 
and Managerial activities include human resource management, finance, IT and 
supervision activities.  
Most of the managerial activities are core activities for the company. These activities 
have been traditionally perceived as more difficult to transfer abroad. Therefore, if 
companies adopt these strategies there is a tendency to control them through internal 
offshoring operations. However, productive and commercial activities are clearly 
perceived as easier to transfer abroad either through internal operations or external. 
Specifically, activities directly related to the production process (productive activities) 
represent a significant cost for manufacturing firms, and most managers consider it 
more efficient to move them abroad through external offshoring operations. In our 
model, managerial activities are used as a baseline (excluded in the model). Age, 
company size and international experience were obtained from the Amadeus data base. 
The nature of the offshored activity (productive, commercial or managerial) was derived 
from the questionnaire. 
A more accurate description of the variables included in the model is presented in Table 
3. 
*** Insert table 3 about here*** 
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor values (VIF). 
Most of the correlations among the variables were small and did not exceed the 
maximum level. Furthermore, the variance-inflation factor (VIF) reveals that the largest 
VIF value is 1.15, which is well below the cut-off of 10 or even 5 (Hair et al., 1999). 
This evidence reduces concerns about multicollinearity. 
*** Insert table 4 about here*** 
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Since the dependent variable in our model –Offshoring Operation Mode– is 
qualitative and polytomous (with the values 0, 1 and 2), the hypotheses were tested 
using a multinomial logit regression model.  
We run 6 different regression models in order to assess the consistency of the 
results, which ensures the robustness of the conclusions. By and large, the models 
present satisfactory indicators of significance (chi-squared values with levels of 
significance of less than 0.001); classification percentages ranged between 69.1% and 
72.7%. The results confirm the majority of the predictions formulated and are consistent 
in all models. 
*** Insert table 5 about here*** 
The first model (MNL 1) illustrates the effect of the control variables. 
Surprisingly, the ownership variable has no influence on managers’ intentions and 
behaviours to implement one offshoring operation mode or other. Company size is 
associated positively to concurrent offshoring operations (COF), although size is not 
significant in the choice of external offshoring operations (EOF) versus internal 
offshoring operations (IOF). This result confirms that largest companies use more 
concurrent offshoring operation most. The international experience is only significant 
when comparing external offshoring operations versus internal offshoring operations. In 
this case, companies using external offshoring mode tend to be those less internationally 
experienced. Related to the type of activity being offshored, there is a clear tendency to 
use internal offshoring operations in managerial activities. 
In the subsequent models (MNL 2, 3, 4 and 5) we add the influence of each 
independent variable separately (cost cutting, market competitiveness, resource seeking 
and imitation practices). We include the effect of all variables together in the final 
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model (MNL 6). In general the theoretical predictions are confirmed when we compare 
pure offshoring operation modes (external versus internal offshoring operations).  
Analysing the first column in each model, except for model 2, we can observe a 
positive relationship between external offshoring operations and managers’ attitudes 
focused on cost cutting, resource seeking and imitation practices. As we can see in the 
final model (MNL 6) these relationships are significant in both cases: EOF versus IOF 
with positive coefficients (H1a, H3a and H4a) and COF versus EOF with negative 
coefficients (H1b, H3b and H4b). The results confirm clearly that managers wishing to 
lower costs prefer to implement external offshoring operations instead of the other 
offshoring operation modes. Also, in companies where they do not possess the 
resources or capabilities needed to gain competitive advantage or need to focus their 
efforts on core competencies, managers prefer to implement external offshoring 
operations versus offshoring operations of an internal nature (IOF and COF). Finally, as 
we hypothesized, managers engaged in offshoring operations motivated by previously 
developed strategic actions by competitors prefer to use external offshoring operations. 
On the other hand, the sign of the variable Market competitiveness is negative 
and significant in the models comparing EOF versus IOF (H2a). However, this effect is 
not validated when we compare EOF versus COF (H2b). These results show that 
managers engaged in offshoring operations seeking organizational improvements tend 
to implement further internal offshoring operations rather than offshoring operations of 
an external nature. As we can see in Table 5, seeking organizational improvements 
decreases the likelihood of implementing external offshoring operations versus purely 
internal (IOF), but not against mixed offshoring operations (COF) as we expected. 
Surprisingly, none of the hypotheses related to the possible different influence of 
the managers’ attitudes over the choice between concurrent offshoring operations and 
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internal offshoring operations are significant (H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c). Compared to 
captive models (internal offshoring operations) and offshore outsourcing models 
(external offshoring operations), concurrent models are most costly to implement. On 
the one hand, as mentioned, firms must incur the costs of both making and buying 
(Parmigiani, 2007). Moreover, firms need to coordinate make and buy activities to avoid 
internal conflicts. On the other hand, the benefits of concurrent models are not as 
transparent as those of offshore outsourcing or captive models because of the 
complexity and intricacies in managing concurrent models. According to our results, it 
seems that concurrent models are used by the largest firms in a more sophisticated final 
stage. Managers’ attitudes do not cause a clear behavior regarding this offshoring 
operation mode. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Research into offshoring has proliferated as the practice of offshoring has become 
widely adopted by multinational corporations as well as small and medium sized firms. 
This study attempted to extend this literature in several ways. 
First, this article is one of the few attempts to use some of the elements of the TPB to 
justify some of the differences in the governance decisions of offshoring operations.  
Interestingly, although there have been many studies identifying various offshoring 
drivers, few have approached the phenomenon in such a comprehensive manner, both 
theoretically and empirically.  Our results indicate that decisions about offshoring 
operation modes are strongly influenced by attitudes and intentions of managers. 
Particularly, in terms of the TPB, the decision seems to be clearly influenced by the 
manager’s attitude and partially determined by competences related to resources and 
experience of the firm. In this sense, we corroborate some of the results of the TPB 
applied to other fields (Conner & Armitage, 1998): attitudes and competences are key 
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predictors of behaviour, and social control plays a less important role. Social control 
could exert some influence ex-ante, in the decision to implement offshoring operations 
or not, but once the decision is made there is no influence in the offshoring mode 
chosen by the manager. Our empirical findings indicate that managers’ attitudes based 
on cost cutting, resource seeking and imitation practices are more likely to adopt 
external offshoring operations; whereas managers’ attitudes focused on increase market 
competitiveness are more likely to adopt internal offshoring operations.  
Second, we introduced and tested the concurrent offshoring mode as another 
alternative choice in offshoring operations. Some authors (Hansen et al., 2011; Mols, 
2010a, 2010b; Parmigiani, 2007) have claimed the importance of this offshoring 
operation mode as a discrete and different option to internal offshoring operations. 
However, according to our results, we could not observe clear differences between 
internal offshoring operations and concurrent offshoring operations. In our sample of 
multinationals firms, the concurrent offshoring seems to be an extension of pure internal 
offshoring. In fact, larger companies tend to make most use of concurring offshoring. 
Therefore, it seems that, contrary to our hypothesis and the common view in the field, 
concurrent offshoring operations do not seem to be an intermediate option between the 
two main operation modes but a final, transformational stage in the evolution of the 
MNE strategies (Jensen & Petersen, 2013). It then becomes a more sophisticated 
operation used after the company has achieved some experience in dealing with the 
other two primary options. These larger and more experienced firms are willing to 
develop both offshoring operations at the same time: to make -taking advantage of their 
own expertise- and to buy -learning from their suppliers-. 
While this study suggests that the understanding of specific managers’ attitudes 
can shed light on whether captive models, offshore outsourcing models, or concurrent 
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models will be chosen by offshoring operations, the intention of this research is not to 
provide a normative guidance for practitioners. However, we can offer some managerial 
implications. The choice of the operation mode is a complicated process involving a 
myriad of factors. The idiosyncratic attributes of each offshoring operation mode further 
complicate the decision behind choosing offshore models. This study suggests that such 
decisions can be reached by analysing managers’ attitude from a control-flexibility 
vantage point of view. Managers can first examine the principal offshoring motivations 
and then assess the associated cost-benefit trade-offs. The integration of this rationale 
into one single framework can offer a much more comprehensive overview of the 
decision and reduce the number of variables that a company would need to consider 
when deciding on which offshoring operation mode to implement.  
Although this study touches upon the advantages and disadvantages of each 
offshoring model from the dichotomy of control and flexibility, it does not provide a 
detailed explicit comparison of these offshoring models from cost-benefit analysis. The 
costs of maintaining offshoring models can be expected to differ among one another. In 
the same vein, the benefits generated from each model also vary given the contingencies 
of offshoring firms. We propose that captive models offer offshoring firms a high level 
of control while offshore outsourcing models give offshoring firms a high level of 
flexibility. Presumably, an optimal balance of control and flexibility is most conducive 
to the performance of offshored firm. A more comprehensive study is needed to take 
cost-benefit analysis of both offshoring and offshored firms into consideration.  
The findings also suggest the need for more research on the nature of concurrent 
models. In spite of salient benefits, concurrent models have not been widely adopted in 
practice (Parmigiani, 2007). This suggests that concurrent models have their inherent 
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limitations in implementation. Future research should further explore the management 
concerns associated with concurrent models.  
The paper also suffers from some data limitations. We acknowledge that the 
implementation of an offshoring strategy is likely be the result of a process involving 
more than one decision makers within the company, and the final result might not 
necessarily reflect the attitude and the intentions of the person that answered the survey. 
Additionally, a further problem arises from the fact that the managerial attitudes and 
intentions are also moderated and affected by the owners' attitudes and intentions, 
meaning that the managers must also satisfy the goals of the owners and that not always 
the latter comply with the goals of the managers. This study is focused on MNE, and in 
these companies the use of internal option is more consolidated than in SMEs. Another 
limitation arises from the lack of country variables. As we were measuring general 
attitudes regarding the offshoring we did not aim to associate the offshoring operation 
mode choice to specific locations.  
We hope future studies can further explore these critical issues. 
31 
 
REFERENCES 
Acedo, F. J., & Galán, J. L. (2011). Export stimuli revisited: The influence of the characteristics 
of managerial decision makers on international behaviour. International Small Business 
Journal, 29 (6), 648-670. 
Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, Personality and Behavior. Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 
UK. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50 (2), 179– 211. 
Alexander, M., & Young, D. (1996). Strategic outsourcing.  Long Range Planning, 29 (1), 116-
119. 
Arik, M. (2013). Framing the offshoring and re-shoring debate: A conceptual framework. 
Journal of Global Business Management, 9 (3), 73-83. 
Askin O. Z., & Masini, A. (2008). Effective Strategies for Internal Outsourcing and Offshoring 
of Business Services: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Operations Management, 26, 
239–256. 
AT Kearney (2005). Outsourcing Strategically for Sustainable Competitive Advantage. A.T. 
Kearney Consulting Group, 2005. 
Axinn, C. N. (1988). Export performance: do managerial perceptions make a difference? 
International Marketing Review, 5 (2), 61-71. 
BCG (2005). Opportunities for Action: achieving success in Business Process Outsourcing and 
Offshoring. Boston Consulting Group, 2005. 
 Benito, R. G. (2015). Why and how motives (still) matter.  The Multinational Business Review, 
23 (1), 15 – 24 
Buckley, P., & Ghauri, P. (2004). Globalisation, economic geography and the strategy of 
multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 81–98. 
Brennan, L., Ferdows, K., Godsell, J., Golini, R., Keegan, R., Kinkel, S.,  & Taylor, M. (2015). 
Manufacturing in the world: where next?. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 35 (9), 1253-1274. 
32 
 
Calof, J. L., & Beamish, P. W. (1995). Adapting to foreign markets: Explaining 
internationalization. International business review, 4 (2), 115-131. 
Chang, S. J., Witteloostuijn, A., & Eden, L. (2010). From the Editors: Common method 
variance in international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 
41, 178–184 
Conner, M., & Armitage, C. J. (1998). Extending the theory of planned behavior: A review and 
avenues for further research. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 1429-1464. 
Contractor, F. J., Kumar, V., Kundu, S. K., & Pedersen, T. (2010). Reconceptualizing the firm 
in a world of outsourcing and offshoring: The organizational and geographical relocation of 
high‐value company functions. Journal of Management Studies, 47(8), 1417-1433. 
 Cuervo-Cazurra , A., &, R. (2015). A set of motives to unite them all?: Revisiting the principles 
and typology of internationalization motives. The Multinational Business Review, 23(1), 2 
– 14. 
Currie, W., & Willcocks, L. P. (1997). New Strategies in IT Outsourcing: Major Trends and 
Global Best Practice-Report. London, Business Intelligence Ltd, December. 
Egger, H., & Egger P. (2006). International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-skilled 
Labour in the EU. Economic Inquiry, 44 (1), 98-108.  
Egger, H., Kreickemeier, U., & Wrona, J. (2015). Offshoring domestic jobs. Journal of 
International Economics, 97(1), 112-125. 
Elia, S., Caniato, F., Luzzini, D., & Piscitello, L. (2014). Governance Choice in Global 
Sourcing of Services: The Impact on Service Quality and Cost Saving Performance. Global 
Strategy Journal, 4(3), 181-199. 
Game, R., & Apfelthaler, G. (2016). Attitude and its role in SME internationalisation: why do 
firms commit to advanced foreign market entry modes?. European Journal of International 
Management, 10 (2), 221-248. 
Gerbl, M., McIvor, R., & Humphreys, P. (2016). Making the business process outsourcing 
decision: why distance matters. International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, 36(9), 1037-1064. 
33 
 
González-Díaz, B., & Gandoy, R. (2016). Offshoring and employment structure in the EU 
periphery: the case of Spain. Applied Economics, 48(14), 1255-1270. 
Größler, A., Timenes Laugen, B., Arkader, R., & Fleury, A. (2013). Differences in outsourcing 
strategies between firms in emerging and in developed markets. International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management, 33(3), 296-321. 
Hair, J., Anderson, R., Tatham, R., & Black, W., (1999). Multivariate Data Analysis. Madrid: 
Prentice Hall Ibérica. 
Hansen, J.P., Mols, N.P., & Villadsen, A.R. (2011). Make and Buy-An Alternative to Make or 
Buy? An Investigation of Four Theoretical Explanations in Danish Municipalities. 
International Journal of Public Administration, 34 (8), 539-552. 
Hutzschenreuter, T., Lewin A.Y., & Dresel S. (2011). Governance modes for offshoring 
activities: A comparison of US and German firms. International Business Review, 20, 291-
313. 
Hutzschenreuter, T., Pedersen, T., & Volberda, H. W. (2007). The role of path dependency and 
managerial intentionality: A perspective on international business research. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38, 1055–1068. 
Jaeger, A. M., & Baliga, B. R. (1985). Control systems and strategic adaptation: Lessons from 
the Japanese experience. Strategic Management Journal, 6 (2), 115-134. 
Jensen, P. D. Ø., & Petersen, B. (2013). Global sourcing of services: risk, process, and 
collaborative architecture. Global Strategy Journal, 3 (1), 67-87. 
Kauppi, K. (2013). Extending the use of institutional theory in operations and supply chain 
management research: Review and research suggestions. International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management, 33 (10), 1318-1345. 
Kinkel, S. (2012). Trends in production relocation and backshoring activities: Changing patterns 
in the course of the global economic crisis. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 32 (6), 696-720. 
34 
 
Kinkel, S., & Maloca, S. (2009). Drivers and antecedents of manufacturing offshoring and 
backshoring—A German perspective. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 15 
(3), 154-165. 
Kolvereid, L., & Isaksen, E. (2006). New business start-up and subsequent entry into self-
employment. Journal of Business Venturing, 21, 866-885. 
KPMG (2007). Rethinking cost structures. KPMG Consulting Group, 2007. 
Lambrecht, B. M., Pawlina, G., & Teixeira, J. C. (2015). Making, buying, and concurrent 
sourcing: Implications for operating leverage and stock beta. Review of Finance, 20(3), 
1013-1043. 
Larsen, M. M., Manning, S., & Pedersen, T. (2013). Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: 
The interplay of complexity, organizational design, and experience. Strategic Management 
Journal, 34 (5), 533-552. 
Levinthal, D., & March, J.G. (1993). The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management Journal, 
14, 95-112.  
Levy, D.L. (2005). Offshoring in the new global political economy. Journal of Management 
Studies, 42, 685-693.  
Lewin, A. Y., & Peeters, C., (2006). Offshoring work: Business hype or the onset of 
fundamental transformation? Long Range Planning, 39 (3), 221-239. 
Lewin, A. Y., & Volverda, H. (2011). Co-evolution of global sourcing: The need to understand 
the underlying mechanisms of firm-decisions to offshore. International Business Review, 
20 (3), 241-251. 
Linder, J. C. (2004). Transformational outsourcing. MIT Sloan Management Review, 45 (2), 52-
58.  
Lumley, F. E. (1928). Principles of sociology. McGraw-Hill. 
 
Maignan, I., & Lukas, B. A. (1997). Entry mode decisions: the role of managers' mental models. 
Journal of Global Marketing, 10 (4), 7-22. 
35 
 
Maskell, P., Pedersen, T., Petersen, B., & Dick‐Nielsen, J. (2007). Learning paths to offshore 
outsourcing: from cost reduction to knowledge seeking. Industry and Innovation, 14 (3), 
239-257. 
McFarlan, F. W., & Nolan, R. (1995). How to manage an IT Outsourcing Alliance. Sloan 
Management Review, 36 (2), 9-23. 
Merchant, K. A. (1985). Control in business organization. Financial Times/Prentice Hall.  
Meyer, K., Wright, M., & Pruthi, S. (2009). Managing knowledge in foreign entry strategies: a 
resource-based analyses. Strategic Management Journal, 30, 557-574. 
Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., & Theoret, A. (1976). The structure of" unstructured" decision 
processes. Administrative science quarterly, 246-275. 
Mols, N.P. (2010a).  How does concurrent sourcing affect performance? Journal of Business 
and Industrial Marketing, 25 (7), 525-534. 
Mols, N.P. (2010b). Economic explanations for concurrent sourcing. Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management, 16, 61-69. 
Morgan, R. E., & Katsikeas, C.S. (1997). Export stimuli: Export intention compared with export 
activity. International Business Review, 6 (5), 477-499. 
Mudambi, R., & Venzin, M. (2010). The strategic nexus of offshoring and outsourcing 
decisions. The Journal of Management Studies, 47(8), 1510-1533. 
Musteen, M. (2016). Behavioral factors in offshoring decisions: A qualitative analysis. Journal 
of Business Research, 69 (9), 3439-3446. 
Nieto, M.J., & Rodríguez, A., (2011). Offshoring of RandD: Looking abroad to improve 
innovation performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 42, 345-361. 
Rodríguez, A., & Nieto, M. J. (2016), Does R&D offshoring lead to SME growth? Different 
governance modes and the mediating role of innovation. Strategic Management Journal, 
37 (8), 1734–1753.  
Nordigården, D., Rehme, J., Brege, S., Chicksand, D., & Walker, H. (2014). Outsourcing 
decisions–the case of parallel production. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 34 (8), 974-1002. 
36 
 
Olsen, K.B. (2006). “Productivity impacts of offshoring and outsourcing: a review”. DSTI 
Working paper 2006/1. Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, París. 
Oshri, I., Kotlarsky, J., & Willcocks, L. P. (2009). The Handbook of Global Outsourcing and 
Offshoring. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Parmigiani, A. (2007). Why Do Firms Both Make and Buy? An Investigation of Concurrent 
Sourcing. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 285-311. 
Parmigiani, A., & Mitchell, W. (2009). Complementarity, capabilities, and the boundaries of the 
firm: the impact of within-firm and interfirm expertise on concurrent sourcing of 
complementary components. Strategic Management Journal, 30 (10), 1065-1091. 
Pedersen, T., Bals, L., Jensen, P. D. Ø., & Larsen, M. M. (2013). The Offshoring Challenge: 
Strategic Design and Innovation for Tomorrow’s Organization. Springer. 
Pfeffer, J. (1987). A Resource Dependence Perspective on Intercorporate Relations. In M.S. 
Mizruchi and M. Scharz (eds): Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis of 
Business. Structural Analysis in the Social Science series, 1, Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 25-56. 
Pukall, T., & Calabró, A. (2014). The internationalization of family firms. A critical review and 
an integrative model. Family Business Review, 27 (2), 103-125. 
Pyndt, J., & Pedersen, T. (2006). Managing global offshoring strategies – A case approach. 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Roza, M., Van den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. (2011). Offshoring strategy: Motives, 
functions, locations, and governance modes of small, medium-sized and large firms. 
International Business Review, 20 (3), 314-323. 
Quinn, J. B., & Hilmer, F. G. (1994). Strategic outsourcing. Sloan management review, 35(4), 
43. 
Scherrer-Rathje, M., Deflorin, P., & Anand, G. (2014). Manufacturing flexibility through 
outsourcing: effects of contingencies. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 34 (9), 1210-1242. 
37 
 
Schewe, G. (1996). Imitation as a strategic option for external acquisition of technology. 
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 13 (1), 55-82. 
Sheshinski, E., & Dreze, J. H. (1976). Demand fluctuations, capacity utilization, and costs. The 
American Economic Review, 66 (5) 731-742. 
Sommer, L. (2010). Internationalization processes of small-and medium-sized enterprises—a 
matter of attitude? Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 8 (3), 288-317. 
Sousa, C. M., Martínez‐López, F. J., & Coelho, F. (2008). The determinants of export 
performance: A review of the research in the literature between 1998 and 2005. 
International Journal of Management Reviews, 10 (4), 343-374. 
Stopford, J. M., & Wells, L. T. (1972). Managing the multinational enterprise: Organization of 
the firm and ownership of the subsidiaries (Vol. 2). New York: Basic Books. 
Tamayo-Torres, J., Barrales-Molina, V., & Nieves Perez-Arostegui, M. (2014). The influence of 
manufacturing flexibility on strategic behaviours: A study based in Certified Quality 
Management Systems. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 
34 (8), 1028-1054. 
Venohr, B., & Meyer, K. (2009). Uncommon common sense. Business Strategy Review, 20 (1): 
38-43. 
Vernon, R. (1979). The product cycle hypothesis in a new international environment. Oxford 
bulletin of economics and statistics, 41 (4), 255-267. 
Wiklund J., & Shepherd, D. (2003). Aspiring for, and Achieving Growth: The Moderating Role 
of Resources and Opportunities. Journal of Management Studies, 40 (8), 1919-1941. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. Free Press, N.Y.  
Yip, G. & Dempster, A., (2005). Using the Internet to enhance global strategy. European 
management Journal, 23, 1-13.  
 
38 
 
Figure 1. Control and flexibility 
 
 
 
Control 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
                                      
                                       Captive model 
 
 
                         
Concurrent model 
 
 
 
    Offshore outsourcing 
 
 High                                                              Low
                           Flexibility 
39 
 
Figure 2: Research model 
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Table 1: Responses received and offshoring operations by origin country 
 
Source: AMADEUS DATA BASE (2007) and own. 
 
Table 2: Rotated component matrixa 
Drivers Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1.- Reduce labour costs  0.809 -0.248 0.001 -0.048 
2.- Reduce other costs 0.725 0.229 -0.041 0.008 
3.- Change fixed costs into variable 0.706 -0.028 0.256 0.180 
4.- Forecast costs more accurately 0.616 0.313 0.206 0.232 
5.- Access to new markets  -0.168 0.759 -0.355 0.096 
6.- Improve the product quality 0.078 0.659 0.314 0.035 
7.- Reduce the  response time to changes 0.194 0.693 0.297 0.066 
8.- Access to high skill employees  0.044 0.357 0.727 -0.101 
9.- Access to non-available technology   0.001 0.064 0.770 0.268 
10.- Focus on core competences 0.298 -0.045 0.696 0.252 
11.- Follow the competitors 0.073 0.015 0.207 0.881 
12.- Common practice in the industry 0.116 0.126 0.071 0.872 
Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. 5 Iterations for Convergence. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 0.724 
          Aprox. Chi-Square      4404.133 
Barlett’s sphericity test        Df    66 
        P-value           0,000
Offshoring
Nº of surveys % Nº of surveys % operations
      Austria 50 1,45 5 1,94 10 5 
      Belgium 147 4,25 7 2,71 4,76 12 
      Denmark 133 3,84 13 5,04 9,77 24 
      France 219 6,33 16 6,20 7,31 26 
      Finland 91 2,63 4 1,55 4,4 13 
      Germany 488 14,1 50 19,38 10,25 72 
      Greece 175 5,06 11 4,26 6,29 32 
      Holland 125 3,61 6 2,33 4,8 22 
      Ireland 35 1,01 2 0,78 0,06 2 
      Italy 706 20,4 56 21,71 7,93 104 
      Luxemburg 4 0,12 0 0,00 0 0 
      Portugal 27 0,78 2 0,78 7,41 3 
      Spain 629 18,18 49 18,99 7,79 80 
      Sweden 202 5,84 17 6,59 8,42 36 
      United Kingdom 429 12,4 20 7,75 4,66 40 
      EU-15 3.460 100 258 100 7,5 466 
Origin Country Surveys Sent Surveys Received Response 
Rate % 
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Table 3. Summary of variables included in the model 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
  FIV   1   2 3 4 5 6   7 8 
Cost   1.022  1           
Market   1.057  0.019   1        
Resource    1.041  -0.017   0.036 1       
Imitation   1.018  -0.010   -0.007 -0.021 1      
Ownership   1.090  0.026     -0.134**  0.090** 0.031 1     
Size  1.114    -0.077**   0.001 -0.018  -0.094** -0.0301   1     
Int. Exp.   1.153    0.080**   0.050  -0.101** -0.009  0.296**   -0.063*   1  
Activity  1.029    0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 1 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01   
Variables  Description 
Dependent Variable     
    Offshoring Operation M ode    Polytomous variable that takes the value "0" when managers’ decision is  
“internal offshoring  operation”, "1" when managers’ decision   is “external 
offshoring operation” and “2” when managers’ decision is to use both operations 
for the same activity  “concurrent offshoring operation”.  
  
Independent Variables  
    
    
Cost cutting   Attitudes associated with cost reduction  (factor loading) .   
Market competitiveness   
  
Attitudes related with market competitiveness, accessing to new markets or 
with differentiation strategies  (factor loading). 
Resource seeking   
  
Attitudes associated with the access to resources
 
(factor loading).  
Imitation  practices  
  
Attitudes related with the competitors strategies
 
(factor loading).  
Control Variables     
    
Subjective norms:   
  Ownership   
  
Perceived behaviour control :   
  
  
Dichotomous variable that takes the value "1" when the company is family -
owned and “0” when is non-family.  
   
  Size   Logarithm of the mean of the number of employees of the last 5 years available 
(2002-2006) of each company. 
  
  Inter national Experience   Number of years the firm is operating in international markets  
  Activity  Type of activity relocated (Dummy Variable: Productive*, Commercial** and 
Managerial*** activities). 
  
* Productive activities include R&D and product design, production and purchasing.  
** Commercial activities include marketing, sales and after -sales activities. 
*** Managerial activities include human resource management, finance, IT and supervision activities.   
42 
 
Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
 
  
  MNL 1   MNL 2     MNL 3  
  EOF/IOF  COF/IOF  COF/EOF   EOF/IOF  COF/IOF   COF/EOF   EOF/IOF  COF/IOF  COF/EOF  
Ownership (Dummy)   0.483 
(p=0.077)  
0.366 
(p=0.211)  
-0.117 
(p=0.747)  
 0.498 
(p=0.069)  
0.357   
(p=0.223)   
-0.141 
(p=0.700)  
 0.425 
(p=0.124)  
0.333 
(p=0.258)  
-0.092 
(p=0.802)  
Size    -0.068 
(p=0.436)  
0.244*  
(p=0.018)  
0.312* 
(p=0.011)  
 -0.066 
(p=0.461)  
0.238*   
(p=0.020)   
0.303* 
(p=0.014)  
 -0.066 
(p=0.446)  
0.240*  
(p=0.019)  
0.306* 
(p=0.012)  
International experience   -0.016*  
(p=0.017)  
-0.010 
(p=0.114)  
0.007 
(p=0.423)  
 -0.016*  
(p=0.017)  
-0.009   
(p=0.139)   
0.007 
(p=0.424)  
 -0.018*  
(p=0.011)  
-0.010 
(p=0.103)  
0.008 
(p=0.361)  
Activity (Dummies)               
  A. Productive   1.217***  
(p=0.001)  
3.026**  
(p=0.003)  
1.808† 
(p=0.092)  
 1.225***  
(p=0.001)  
3.024**   
(p=0.003)   
1.800† 
(p=0.094)  
 1.126**  
(p=0.002)  
2.984**  
(p=0.004)  
1.859† 
(p=0.084)  
  A. Commercial   -0.276 
(p=0.522)  
3.018**  
(p=0.003)  
3.294**  
(p=0.003)  
 -0.221 
(p=0.611)  
2.976**   
(p=0.004)   
3.197**  
(p=0.004)  
 -0.323 
(p=0.457)  
3.001**  
(p=0.004)  
3.323**  
(p=0.002)  
Cost Cutting       0.172 
(p=0.188)  
-0.152   
(p=0.284)   
-0.323† 
(p=0.064)  
    
Market Competitiveness
 
            -0.333*  
(p=0.017)  
-0.179 
(p=0.245)  
0.154 
(p=0.409)  
Resource  Seeking               
Imitation  Practices               
Constant  -1.460**  
(p=0.010)  
  
-5.642***  
(p=0.000)  
 
-4.183***  
(p=0.001)  
 -1.522**  
(p=0.008)  
-5.626***   
(p=0.000)   
-4.103***  
(p=0.001)  
 -1.321*  
(p=0.021)  
-5.546***  
(p=0.000)  
-4.225***  
(p=0.001)  
N   466  466    466 
Chi -square  68.48***   72.03***     74.75***  
 -2 log likelihood  649.07  645.52    642.80  
Correct Classification (%)   70.0  69.1    70.8 
† < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
 
 
  
     
Table 5 (continued). Multinomial Logistic Regression 
   
 MNL 4   MNL 5    MNL 6  
 EOF/IOF COF/IOF COF/EOF  EOF/IOF  COF/IOF COF/EOF  EOF/IOF COF/IOF COF/EOF  
Ownership (Dummy)  0.227  
(p=0.429)  
0.329 
(p=0.267) 
0.102 
(p=0.786) 
 0.481 
(p=0.081) 
0.382 
(p=0.194) 
-0.99 
(p=0.788) 
 0.204 
(p=0.497)  
0.331  
(p=0.276)  
0.127  
(p=0.747)  
Size  - 0.048  
(p=0.609) 
0.238* 
(p=0.020) 
0.286* 
(p=0.025) 
 - 0.057 
(p=0.508) 
0.250* 
(p=0.017) 
0.307* 
(p=0.013) 
 -0.025 
(p=0.789)  
0.231* 
(p=0.024) 
0.256*   
(p=0.045) 
International Experience   - 0.017 
(p=0.020) 
-0.009 
(p=0.117) 
0.008 
(p=0.392) 
 - 0.015*  
(p=0.023) 
-0.010 
(p=0.111) 
0.006 
(p=0.517) 
 -0.017* 
(p=0.017)  
-0.009 
(p=0.132) 
0.008 
(p=0.397) 
Activity (Dummies)                
  A. Productive  1.203** 
(p=0.002) 
3.019** 
(p=0.003) 
1.816† 
(p=0.092) 
 1.264*** 
(p=0.001) 
3.004** 
(p=0.004) 
1.740 
(p=0.106) 
 1.252** 
(p=0.002) 
2.944** 
(p=0.004) 
1.692 
(p=0.119) 
  A. Commercial - 0.289 
(p=0.515) 
3.021** 
(p=0.003) 
3.310** 
(p=0.003) 
 - 0.255 
(p=0.557) 
3.006** 
(p=0.003) 
3.261** 
(p=0.003) 
 -0.137 
(p=0.766) 
2.946** 
(p=0.004) 
3.083** 
(p=0.005) 
Cost Cutting            0.327* 
(p=0.032) 
-0.135 
(p=0.340) 
-0.463* 
(p=0.015) 
Market Competitiveness             -0.306* 
(p=0.034) 
-0.163 
(p=0.297) 
0.143 
(p=0.452) 
Resource  Seeking  0.646*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.102 
(p=0.496) 
-0.544** 
(p=0.003) 
      0.744*** 
(p=0.000) 
0.062 
(p=0.685) 
-0.682***   
(p=0.000) 
Imitation  Practices       0.303*   
(p=0.021) 
-0.131 
(p=0.385) 
-0.434* 
(p=0.017) 
 0.436** 
(p=0.002) 
-0.134 
(p=0.386) 
-0.569** 
(p=0.003) 
Constant  - 1.537** 
(p=0.010) 
-5.588*** 
(p=0.000) 
-4.051*** 
(p=0.001) 
 -1.609** 
(p=0.005) 
-5.679*** 
(p=0.000) 
-4.070*** 
(p=0.001) 
 -1.790** 
(p=0.004) 
-5.507*** 
(p=0.000) 
-3.717** 
(p=0.004) 
N  466  466  466 
Chi -square  93.43***  
  
 
 75.62***   116.66***  
-2 log likelihood  624.12   641.92   600.89  
Correct Classification (%)  71.2   69.5   72.7  
† < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001  
      
